Case Summaries
[03/10]
Primiano v. Cook
In an action against the manufacturer of an artificial elbow, summary judgment for defendant is reversed where the exclusion of plaintiff's expert's evidence was error as plaintiff's expert, with a sufficient basis in education and experience, testified that the artificial joint "failed to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in light of its nature and intended function," which was enough to assist a trier of fact.
[03/10]
Fortis Corp. Ins. SA. v. Viken Ship Mgmt. AS
In a maritime shipping case involving a claim for rust damage to steel coils caused by exposure to seawater during a journey from Poland to Ohio, judgment of the district court is affirmed where: 1) a ship manager charged with providing a Master, officers and crew, and performing various other ship-management tasks for the shipping vessel does not qualify as a "carrier" under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), and thus the COGSA's one year-statute of limitations does not bar the underlying suit; and 2) defendant's claim that the district court's finding of negligence was based on clearly erroneous factual findings is rejected.
[03/10]
Cameron v. N.Y.
In an action for false arrest and malicious prosecution, judgment for defendant-officers is reversed where: 1) prosecutors' opinions as to probable cause and complaining officers' credibility are irrelevant in virtually all cases involving claims of malicious prosecution; and 2) the introduction of such evidence was not harmless because it provided strong external validation for propositions that otherwise would have come in only from the defendants' mouths.
[03/09]
Zia Trust Co. v. Montoya
In an action for excessive force brought by family members of a man defendant-officer shot and killed while responding to a domestic disturbance, denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is affirmed where the court could not say that a van fifteen feet away, which according to the plaintiffs was clearly stuck on a pile of rocks, gave defendant probable cause to believe that there was a threat of serious physical harm to himself or others that would justify his use of force.
[03/09]
Espinosa v. City & County of San Francisco
In a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action claiming excessive force by defendants-officers, denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is affirmed where: 1) defendants failed to show as a matter of law that plaintiff's decedent did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy; 2) the district court properly found that defendants failed to show as a matter of law that the emergency and exigency exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applied; 3) defendants failed to show that there were no questions of fact regarding whether a security guard had apparent authority to consent and implied consent; and 4) the district court did not err in finding that there were genuine issues of fact regarding whether the officers intentionally or recklessly provoked a confrontation.
[03/09]
McGuan v. Endovascular Techs., Inc.
In plaintiffs' products liability action against the makers of a device for use by surgeons to treat abdominal aortic aneurysms, for injuries suffered after they were implanted with the device, grant of defendants' motion for a summary judgment is affirmed where: 1) plaintiffs' fraud claims of FDA violations are preempted under Buckman; 2) the trial court did not err in denying plaintiffs' motions to amend their complaints; and 3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants' motion to seal documents.
[03/09]
Seltzer v. Barnes
Trial court's denial of defendant's anti-SLAPP motion, arising from an underlying suit involving claims against a property management company and homeowners' association, is reversed where: 1) the trial court erred in concluding plaintiff's two causes of action against defendant do not arise from speech or petitioning activity where his alleged conduct was the negotiation of a settlement in the prior case; and 2) because defendant may not be held liable for the alleged conduct under the litigation privilege, plaintiff has failed to show a probability of prevailing on her causes of action for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
[03/05]
Bustos v. Martini Club Inc.
In a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action based on a late-night confrontation with several off-duty police officers, dismissal of the action is affirmed where: 1) the election of remedies provisions in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 101.106 applied to state law intentional tort claims against a governmental unit and its employees; 2) plaintiff did not allege facts to suggest that the officers who assaulted him misused or abused their official power; and 3) bystander officers had no constitutional duty to prevent the alleged assault.
[03/05]
Howard v. St. Germain
In an appeal from the district court's order assessing attorney's fees against defendants based on their improper removal of the case, the order is affirmed where the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in taxing costs and attorney's fees to defendants because an objectively reasonable basis for removal did not exist.
[03/05]
Doe v. S. Carolina Dep't of Soc. Servs.
In a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action brought by a minor child and her adoptive parents against defendant, an Adoption Specialist with the South Carolina Department of Social Services (SCDSS), alleging violations of their substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and state law claims against SCDSS under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA), judgment is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded where: 1) when a state involuntarily removes a child from her home, thereby taking the child into its custody and care, the state has taken an affirmative act to restrain the child's liberty, triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause and imposing "some responsibility for the child's safety and general well being"; 2) because it would not have been apparent to a reasonable social worker in defendant's position that her actions violated the Fourteenth Amendment, she is entitled to qualified immunity; 3) prospective adoptive parents have no substantive due process right to the disclosure of a child's history of sexual abuse; and 4) district court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment on the state law claims for gross negligence against SCDSS is vacated and remanded for consideration of the applicability of section 15-78-60(25).
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